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AN EVOLVING WORKFORCE, AN ADAPTING 
LAW: TITLE VII’S COVERAGE OF GENDER 
IDENTITY AND CRIMINAL HISTORY  
SANDRA PULLMAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the half-century since the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, workplace protections under the statute have expanded 
in a variety of ways.  Legal theories that were once considered 
novel have increasingly been accepted in federal courts across the 
country, extending coverage to more employees than ever before.  
Yet, an analysis of these developing issues also exposes the 
limitations of federal antidiscrimination law.  Below, this Article 
examines the ways that Title VII has been applied to two 
particularly vulnerable groups: transgender individuals and 
individuals with criminal records. 
I. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY 
Although there have been significant victories for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) rights in recent years, 
there is no nationwide protection from employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.  Transgender workers in particular face high rates of 
discrimination:  Nearly half of transgender employees in a 2011 
survey reported being fired, not hired, or denied promotions 
based on their gender identities.1  Indeed, Vice President Joe 
Biden has observed that transgender discrimination is “the civil 
† Sandra Pullman is an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau 
of the New York State Attorney General’s Office, an adjunct clinical professor at 
Brooklyn Law School, and a graduate of Harvard Law School. 
1 JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf. 
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rights issue of our time.”2  While bills to add sexual orientation 
and gender identity to federal law have languished in Congress, 
some courts and agencies have interpreted Title VII, in some 
cases, to provide coverage for transgender workers under sex 
stereotyping and other legal theories.  Elsewhere, advocates 
continue to rely on more expansive state and local civil rights 
laws to vindicate their clients’ rights. 
A. Lack of Coverage 
On its face, Title VII does not include gender identity as a 
protected category.3  As a result, Title VII was originally 
interpreted to exclude coverage for transgender individuals.4  In 
1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
rejected a claim by a transgender worker based on Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination, asserting that “Congress had 
only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind.”5  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later agreed that 
“Congress has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals,” 
and held that “discrimination based on one’s transsexualism does 
not fall within the protective purview of the Act.”6  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently 
concluded, “[A] prohibition against discrimination based on an 
individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder 
or discontent with the sex into which they were born.”7 
 
 
2 Jennifer Bendery, Joe Biden: Transgender Discrimination Is ‘The Civil Rights 
Issue of Our Time,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2012, 11:16 PM), http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/2012/10/30/joe-biden-transgender-rights_n_2047275.html (last updated 
Oct. 31, 2012, 2:17 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
4 See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen 
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977). 
5 Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662–63. 
6 Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750. 
7 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
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B. Sex Stereotyping 
Meanwhile, beginning in the late 1980s, courts began 
interpreting the statute’s prohibition of sex discrimination more 
expansively.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,8 the United States 
Supreme Court found a company liable for refusing to promote a 
female accountant because she did not act sufficiently feminine.9  
The Court explained: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.”10 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court permitted a claim 
of same-sex sexual harassment to proceed under Title VII.  In 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,11 the Court noted, 
“male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was 
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with 
when it enacted Title VII.”12  However, “statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than 
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”13 
Following this expansive approach to statutory 
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit later applied the sex-
stereotyping theory to cover a transgender prison guard under 
the Gender Motivated Violence Act (“GMVA”).  In Schwenk v. 
Hartford,14 the plaintiff sued a state prison guard and several 
prison officials for an attempted rape.15  Relying on Title VII 
jurisprudence, the court held that the rulings had been rendered 
moot by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse, which 
excluded transgender persons from protection under 
8 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
9 Id. at 272. 
10 Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
12 Id. at 79. 
13 Id. 
14 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
15 Id. at 1192. 
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antidiscrimination law.16  Therefore, a transgender plaintiff could 
state a Title VII claim for discrimination based on the failure to 
act in accordance with sex stereotypes.17 
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit followed suit in Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio,18 finding 
that a transgender woman had successfully pleaded a Title VII 
sex discrimination claim, since “[s]ex stereotyping based on a 
person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible 
discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior.”19  In 
Smith, the plaintiff was a lieutenant with the Salem Fire 
Department who was suspended after informing her supervisor 
that she intended to transition from male to female.20  The court 
found that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief, explaining that 
just as discrimination against women for not wearing dresses or 
makeup is discrimination on the basis of sex, “employers who 
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and 
makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex 
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but 
for the victim’s sex.”21  A year later in Barnes v. City of 
Cincinnati,22 the Sixth Circuit upheld a Title VII claim brought 
by a transgender police officer against the city where she alleged 
that she was denied a promotion because her supervisors thought 
she was not masculine enough.23  Citing Smith, the court held 
that Barnes had made out a claim for discrimination based on 
her failure to conform to sex stereotypes.24  In recent years, 
several other courts have recognized the viability of Title VII 
claims for sex stereotyping brought by gender nonconforming 
individuals.25 
16 Id. at 1201–02. 
17 See id. 
18 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
19 Id. at 572, 575. 
20 Id. at 568. 
21 Id. at 574. 
22 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
23 Id. at 738. 
24 Id. at 737. 
25 See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–64 (3d Cir. 2001); Higgins 
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. City 
of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 523 
U.S. 1001 (1998); EEOC v. Grief Bros. Corp., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641, at 
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C. Gender Identity Discrimination as Sex Discrimination 
More recently, courts have held that Title VII’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination against those 
who have transitioned from one sex to another.  For example, a 
federal court in the District of Columbia reasoned that just as 
“[d]iscrimination ‘because of religion’ easily encompasses 
discrimination because of a change of religion,” discrimination 
because of sex should also include discrimination because of a 
change in sex.26  The court accepted the petitioner’s argument 
that “discrimination on the basis of gender identity is sex 
discrimination.”27  In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) similarly held that 
discrimination based on gender identity, change of sex, and 
transgender status, is discrimination on the basis of sex, 
prohibited by Title VII.28 
Such arguments have not been as persuasive with regard to 
sexual orientation discrimination; courts have typically rejected 
allegations that Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping 
extends to employees’ sexual preferences or same-sex 
relationships.29  Yet just last year, a federal court in D.C. found 
that a plaintiff had asserted a valid Title VII claim: 
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he is “a homosexual male whose 
sexual orientation is not consistent with the Defendant’s 
perception of acceptable gender roles,” that his “status as a 
homosexual male did not conform to the Defendant’s gender 
stereotypes associated with men . . . ” and that “his orientation 
as homosexual had removed him from [his employer’s] 
preconceived definition of male.”30 
*15 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-
CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003). 
26 Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis 
omitted). 
27 Id. at 306. 
28 EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
29 See, e.g., Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 
35237, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (holding that harassment based on sexual 
preference is not actionable under Title VII); Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. 
IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) (holding that 
intent to change sex is not actionable under Title VII). 
30 Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations 
omitted). 
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D. Title VII Limitations 
Not all jurisdictions have adopted the above reasoning, and 
indeed, some courts continue to reject Title VII claims brought by 
transgender individuals because they are not part of an explicitly 
protected category.31  Others draw a line between allowing sex-
stereotyping claims by transgender plaintiffs and statutory 
protection for transgender workers.  For example, a federal court 
in Georgia allowed a claim to proceed where the plaintiff alleged 
that she was fired because her “desire to present as a woman at 
work did not comport with [her employer’s] stereotype of how a 
biological male should dress or behave.”32  The court 
distinguished this claim from one based on that plaintiff’s gender 
transition, which would not have been actionable.  The court 
observed, “While transsexuals are not members of a protected 
class based on sex, those who do not conform to gender 
stereotypes are members of a protected class based on sex.”33  
However, this distinction falls apart when one considers that 
transgender individuals, by definition, do not conform to 
stereotypes associated with their gender assigned at birth. 
E. State and Local Law 
In New York, state and local law provide additional 
protections for LGBT workers, helping to fill in the gaps of Title 
VII’s coverage.  On the state level, the New York State Human 
Rights Law protects individuals from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, although it lacks explicit coverage for 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.34  Nonetheless, it 
has been interpreted broadly to include transgender persons as a 
protected group as far back as 1977.35  Later courts have also  
 
31 See, e.g., Creed, 2009 WL 35237, at *10 (stating that “Title VII’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination doesn’t extend so far” as to cover discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status); Mulberry Lutheran Home, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3 (holding 
that the plaintiff’s “intent to change his sex does not support a claim of sex 
discrimination under Title VII because that intended behavior did not place him 
within the class of persons protected under Title VII from discrimination based on 
sex”). 
32 Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
33 Id. at 1300. 
34 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2015). 
35 Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 722, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 273 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1977). 
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held that the state antidiscrimination law covers transgender 
individuals though the legislature has not yet amended its 
definition of “sex” to explicitly say so.36 
The protections under New York City law are even stronger.  
In 2002, New York City amended its City Human Rights Law to 
redefine “gender.”  The definition now includes not only actual or 
perceived sex, but also “a person’s gender identity, self-image, 
appearance, behavior or expression, whether or not that gender 
identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression is 
different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex 
assigned to that person at birth.”37 
However, some aspects of these laws still fail to provide the 
comprehensive remedies contained in Title VII.  The New York 
State Human Rights Law does not provide attorney fees,38 which 
limits incentives for private counsel to take such cases on 
contingency.  Additionally, the New York City Human Rights 
Law has its limits with regard to public employees.39  For 
example, in Jattan v. Queens College of City University of New 
York,40 the court dismissed the plaintiff’s City Human Rights 
claim against Queens College, an instrumentality of New York 
State, holding that “the City of New York does not have the 
power to waive the State’s sovereign immunity.”41 
II. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF CRIMINAL HISTORY 
As with gender identity, criminal history is not a protected 
category under federal antidiscrimination law.  Yet individuals 
with criminal records also face significant barriers to obtaining 
and maintaining viable employment, especially along racial lines, 
and Title VII has accordingly been used to provide some 
protection from irrational discrimination on this basis.    
36  See Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *8–
9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 164 Misc. 2d 547, 554–56, 
626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395–96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1995). See generally Buffong v. Castle 
on the Hudson, 12 Misc. 3d 1193(A), 824 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 
2005). 
37 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (N.Y. Leg. Publ’g Co. 2015). 
38 E.g., N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ. v. Sears, 83 A.D.2d 959, 960, 443 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (2d 
Dep’t 1981). 
39 See Jattan v. Queens Coll. of City Univ. of N.Y., 64 A.D.3d 540, 541–42, 883 
N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (2d Dep’t 2009). 
40 64 A.D.3d 540, 883 N.Y.S.2d 110. 
41 Id. at 542, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 112. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 138 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 138 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_PULLMAN.DOC 3/24/16  12:01 AM 
664 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:657   
A growing number of ex-offenders are encountering obstacles 
to employment opportunities.  After all, the United States 
incarcerates a larger percentage of its population than any 
country in the world.42  If this trend continues, approximately 
6.6% of all persons born in this country in 2001 will serve time in 
prison during their lifetimes.43  These high levels of incarceration 
are further plagued by stark racial disparities as African 
Americans and Hispanics are incarcerated at a rate that is two to 
three times their proportion of the general population.44  One in 
seventeen white men is expected to serve time in prison during 
his lifetime; this rate rises to one in six for Hispanic men and to 
one in three for African-American men.45 
Upon release from prison, there are continuing collateral 
consequences of a criminal record, particularly in employment.  
Studies have found that seventy-five percent of employers now 
screen their candidates by asking them to divulge their criminal 
history during the hiring process.46  Such barriers to employment 
not only deprive ex-offenders of a second chance and frustrate the 
criminal justice goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society, but they also diminish public safety, since job instability 
is associated with higher crime and increased recidivism.47  
42 See Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Tenth Edition), INT’L 
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., 2013, at 2–6, available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (noting the United States prison 
population rate of 716 per 100,000 people is the highest in the world). 
43 THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: 
PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 EMPLOYEESCREENIQ, BACKGROUND SCREENING TRENDS & PRACTICES: 
RESULTS OF EMPLOYEESCREENIQ’S 6TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF U.S.-BASED EMPLOYERS 
(Apr. 2015), available at http://content.employeescreen.com/hubfs/ESIQ_2015_sur 
vey_final2.pdf?t=1446555272215. 
47 See THELTON E. HENDERSON CENTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE AT BERKELEY LAW, 
A HIGHER HURDLE: BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMERLY INCARCERATED 
WOMEN 7 (2008), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=1001&context=werc (noting that as unemployment increases, 
crime increases and as wages go up, crime is reduced); see also NEW YORK CITY BAR 
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PREVIOUSLY 
INCARCERATED, LEGAL EMPLOYERS TAKING THE LEAD: ENHANCING EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PREVIOUSLY INCARCERATED 35 (2008), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Task_Force_Report08.pdf (“Providing secure 
employment with prospects for advancement to the formerly incarcerated will 
reduce recidivism, reduce the costs of maintaining a huge prison population (thereby 
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Furthermore, racial inequities persist in these hiring practices:  
Black applicants with criminal records are hired at lower rates 
than whites with the same criminal history, and blacks without 
any criminal conviction are hired at rates similar to or even 
lower than whites with convictions.48 
Two main causes of action are available to employees to 
challenge employers’ bans on hiring applicants with criminal 
records.  Under federal law, there is a viable cause of action 
based on the disproportionate racial impact of the practice.  
Under state law, applicants for employment are entitled to an 
individualized consideration of their criminal records, regardless 
of race. 
A. Disparate Impact Analysis 
Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.49  In 1971, the 
Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to proscribe not only “overt 
discrimination[,] but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation.”50  Therefore, even “practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in 
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”51 
Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact.52  In this context, national 
data can be used to support a finding that criminal record 
exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national 
origin.  Applicant flow information, workforce data, criminal 
history background check data, demographic availability 
statistics, incarceration and conviction data, and relevant labor 
market statistics can all be used to create a prima facie showing 
of disparate impact.  The issue is not whether the workforce is 
racially balanced,53 but rather whether policy or practice deprives 
lowering taxes or reducing the pressure to raise them), strengthen family ties, and 
enhance public safety—all of which are important social objectives.”). 
48 Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 958 fig.6 
(2003). 
49 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
50 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
51 Id. at 430. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
53 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (holding a “bottom line” racial 
balance in the workforce “does not preclude . . . employees from establishing a prima 
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a disproportionate number of Title VII protected individuals from 
employment opportunities.54  Additionally, in assessing applicant 
data, a lack of applicants may also be considered probative 
because an employer’s “application process might itself not 
adequately reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since 
otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying” 
because of a discriminatory policy or practice.55 
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, the second step of the analysis looks for  
employer-produced evidence that the discriminatory policy is job 
related and consistent with business necessity.56  In Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co.,57 the Court focused on the lack of a nexus 
between the hiring requirements and the successful performance 
of the job.58  The Court held that the job requirement must “bear 
a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs 
for which it was used” and “must measure the person for the job 
and not the person in the abstract.”59  
Decisions by the Eighth Circuit and Third Circuit clarify the 
business necessity analysis in the context of criminal history 
bans.  In 1975, in Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,60 the 
Eighth Circuit found that Title VII prohibited an employer from 
“follow[ing] the policy of disqualifying for employment any 
applicant with a conviction for any crime other than a minor 
traffic offense.”61  The Green panel identified three factors 
(“Green factors”) that were relevant in the analysis of whether 
facie case” of disparate impact, “nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to 
such a case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54 Id. at 453–54. 
55 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977). 
56 Id. at 331. 
57 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
58 Id. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, 
the practice is prohibited.”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14 (interpreting 
Griggs to require a showing that the “discriminatory employment practice . . . [is] 
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge”); 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (“[D]iscriminatory tests are 
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be ‘predictive 
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which 
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being 
evaluated.’ ” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2015))). 
59 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 436. 
60 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
61 Id. at 1293, 1298–99. 
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the exclusion was job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity: (1) the nature and gravity of 
the offense or conduct, (2) the time that has passed since the 
offense or conduct or the completion of the sentence, and (3) the 
nature of the job held or sought.62 
The Third Circuit, in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority,63 further developed the Green factors.  
The plaintiff, Douglas El, after being rejected for the job as a 
paratransit driver, challenged Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority’s (“SEPTA”) policy of excluding 
everyone convicted of a violent offense.64  SEPTA terminated El 
after SEPTA learned of his conviction of second-degree murder 
forty years prior when El was fifteen.65  Despite “reservations 
about [the] policy in the abstract,” the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of SEPTA.66  
Title VII, according to the court, requires “the policy under 
review [to] accurately distinguish between applicants that pose 
an unacceptable level of risk and those that do not.”67  Although 
it affirmed the grant of summary judgment, the court noted that 
if El had “hired an expert who testified that there is time at 
which a former criminal is no longer any more likely to recidivate 
than the average person, then there would be a factual question 
for the jury to resolve.”68  The Third Circuit distinguished the 
employer’s policy in El from the employer’s policy in Green by 
emphasizing the fact that paratransit drivers have access to 
“vulnerable members of society.”69 
Finally, even if an employer demonstrates that its policy is 
job related for the position in question and is consistent with 
business necessity, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that 
the employer’s legitimate goals can be served by a less 
discriminatory “alternative employment practice.”70 
62 Id. at 1297 (finding that the Iowa provision in question suffered from such 
narrowing criteria). 
63 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
64 Id. at 235–36. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 235. 
67 Id. at 245. 
68 Id. at 247. 
69 Id. at 243, 245. 
70 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); see 
also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988). 
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B. EEOC Regulations 
In April 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission published EEOC Enforcement Guidance 915.002 
(“Guidance”) regarding  employers’ use of criminal records in 
employment screening.71  The Commission interpreted Title VII 
to call for a “fact-based analysis to determine if an exclusionary 
policy or practice is job related and consistent with business 
necessity.”72 
The Commission provided two ways by which to defend a 
disparate impact claim against a policy of exclusion based on 
criminal history: (1) validation studies of the policy pursuant to 
federal regulations or (2) consideration of at least the three Green 
factors, plus an individualized assessment of applicants.73  An 
individualized assessment should generally include three 
features.  The employer should: (1) inform the applicant that he 
may be excluded because of past criminal conduct, (2) provide an 
opportunity to the individual to demonstrate that the exclusion 
does not properly apply to him, and (3) consider whether the 
individual’s additional information shows that the policy as 
applied is not job related and consistent with business 
necessity.74 
While noting that Title VII does not require an 
individualized assessment, the EEOC identifies types of 
additional information to consider, including the age of the 
applicant at the time of the offense, evidence of rehabilitation, 
and the facts and circumstances of the offense.75 
Generally, the EEOC advises employers to eliminate blanket 
exclusions based simply on the existence of a criminal record.76  
The Commission recommends that an employer develop a 
“narrowly tailored written policy and procedure” for screening 
applicants and employees in a way that identifies essential job 
requirements, lists the specific offenses that may demonstrate  
 
71 See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN 
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), 
2012 WL 1499883. 
72 Id. at *12. 
73 See id. at *2. 
74 Id. at *17. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at *16. 
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unfitness for performing such jobs, and identifies the duration of 
the exclusions.77  The EEOC further notes that justifications for 
the policy and procedures should also be recorded.78 
C. State Law 
Meanwhile, New York Correction Law Article 23-A, passed 
in 1976, provides comprehensive coverage for all job applicants 
with a criminal history requiring an individualized analysis and 
obviating the need for plaintiffs to provide statistical analysis of 
racial impact.79  Under article 23-A, an employer may not deny or 
terminate employment on the basis of prior criminal convictions, 
except under two narrowly defined circumstances: 
(1) [T]here is a direct relationship between one or more of the 
previous criminal offenses and the specific license or 
employment sought or held by the individual; or (2) the issuance 
or continuation of the license or the granting or continuation of 
the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property 
or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general 
public.80 
Furthermore, article 23-A codifies the Green factors and 
additional relevant information which employers must consider: 
(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to 
encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously 
convicted of one or more criminal offenses. 
(b) The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to 
the license or employment sought or held by the person. 
(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which 
the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or 
ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities. 
(d) The time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the 
criminal offense or offenses. 
(e) The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the 
criminal offense or offenses. 
(f) The seriousness of the offense or offenses. 
(g) Any information produced by the person, or produced on his 
behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct. 
77 Id. at *23. 
78 Id. 
79 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–755 (McKinney 2015). 
80 Id. § 752. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 141 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 141 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_PULLMAN.DOC 3/24/16  12:01 AM 
670 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:657   
(h) The legitimate interest of the public agency or private 
employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of 
specific individuals or the general public.81 
Article 23-A applies to all governmental and private employers 
operating in New York State that employ ten or more 
individuals.82 
III. CONCLUSION 
Federal courts have taken laudable steps toward addressing 
inequality in the workplace by interpreting Title VII to provide 
coverage for disadvantaged groups that fall outside the 
statutorily proscribed categories.  Yet given the limits on the law, 
state and local antidiscrimination statutes continue to play a role 
in helping employees vindicate their civil rights.  The examples of 
transgender employees and job applicants with criminal records 
show that federal antidiscrimination law has in some ways 
adapted to address current civil rights issues, but it still has a 
long way to go. 
81 Id. § 753(1). 
82 Id. § 751. 
